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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
- vs. RAYMOND STROHM,

)

Case No.

11166

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATI£MENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a jury verdict of guilty to
t!w crimes of Burglary in the Third Degree and Grand
Laret>ny.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The jury found the defendant guilty of Burglary in
the Third Degree and Grand Larceny. He was sentenced
to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term as
provided by law.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the jury verdict rendered against him, or in the alternative, to grant him a
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2
new trial ·with instructions in accordance with the point
raised on appeal.
f\T A '1 E~fKN'l O"U' FACTS
1

1

The appellant was convicted of Burglary in the
Third Degree and Grand Larceny after trial by jury.
']_'he victim of thP alleged offense was Delivery Service
and Transfer Company of Salt Lake City, Utah. (T-3)
The State's case rested upon the appellant's recent
possession of an electric typewriter and postage meter
taken from the victim's establishment (T-7) plus an
alleged confession of the appellant. (T-21).
The appellant made an explanation of his possession
of the items before the jury. (T-43) He testified that he
took no part in the burglary of Transfer Service (T-43)
hut rather items in question had bePn brought to him by
l\fike .Martine>z and Ernie Gallegos. (T-40) He testified
that he ,,-as ask<'<l li~- thosP two men to s<'ll thE~ typewriter for $!)0.
During the trial, Nick Palukos, an investigating officer with the Salt Lake City Police Department was
called to the stand. (T-21 ). He testified that he interYi<'W<'<l tlw ap]H•llant on .Jul~- 1:Hit or 14th in the Salt
Lab· Co1tnt~- Jail (T-:21 ), ,,·hen• tlH· ddPndant was being
h<'l<l on anotlH r rharge. (T-20)
1
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After a technically incomplete Miranda warning,
('1 -19) the officer testified that he concluded that the
1

r)pfendant understood yd waived his rights (T-21). This
1rns in :,;pite of the fact that the defendant was visibly
ill from narcotic withdrawal (T-22). He was so ill, in
fact, that the officer stopped interrogating him after a
short time and told him that he would return the next
day (T-21). vVhen Palukos returned, the defendant deelinPd to talk further (T-21).
During the interrogation and before its termination
because of the defendant's illness, the officer obtained
a confession or admission from the defendant to the effect that he along with Michael Walker and Ursel Harris
(not :Martinez and Gallegos) had gone to the Delivery
Service and Transfer building (T-23, 24). The defendant
had stayed in the car while the other men entered the
hnilding. They returned with the property and placed
it in tlw rar and left tlw scenP (T-23).
At trial, the above admission was admitted in evirlPnce over an objection to its being involuntary. (T-22~3) rl'lw trial judge ruled that, "as to whether or not
\\'hat he said was voluntary, is a question for the jury.
rndPr the circumstances that this has developed here
... whPth<>r rnlnntan or roerced will be a matter for
tlH' jnr>, tn c1ut<'rmi1w." (T-'.?:"l).
,\ t trial, tlH' appellant took tlw stand in his own lwliaJJ'. ('l'-3~)). (rl'-42) r1_111e appellant recalls having a con-
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versation with Officer Palukos in the jail but can't recall
what he told him. He indicated that at the time, he was
sick from narcotic withdrawal and felt that the officer
was threatening him and putting words in his mouth.
('l1-43, 44). He further testified that he felt that Officer
Palukos had the incident mixed up (T-47) with others
under investigation.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE
VOLUNTARINESS OF THE APPELLANT'S CONFESSION
BEFORE ALLOWING THE SAME TO BE HEARD BY THE
JURY.

It is submitted that the Trial Court conunitted pri>·
judicial error requiring reversal in ruling that the question of the voluntariness of a confession is for the jury.
In so ruling, the• trial court violated not only the defendant's right to Dm· Process hut also the procedural
rul1>s srt down h:-.' this court.

In Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 Sup. Ct. 1774,
12 L. FM 2d 908 (19G4), the United State Supreme Court
~;1•t do\\'TI comditutional .~·nid1•hws for thP procedurr rela-

tivP to ddermi11inµ; nJlnntariiwss of a eonfrssion. ~'he
Court hrld that tlH' N<'w York procechm~ for determining
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voluntariness of a confession offered by the prosecution
violated the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment.
The Kew York procedure that was struck down was as
follows: the trial court excluded the confession if it could
in no circumstance be deemed voluntary, but left to the
jury the ultimate determination of its voluntary character, as ·well as its truthfulness, if the evidence presented
a fair qnestion as to its voluntariness. The underlying
rational of the decision was that a jury could not be assumed to have reliably found a confession voluntary
wlwrP it also detPrminPs its truthfulness.
It is submitted that the trial judge's ruling creates
a procC'dme that violates the underlying principle of the
Jackson v. Denno decision in a manner far worse than
tlw NPw York procedure struck down in that case.

Here the trial judge after hearing substantial evidPncP to the effect that the defendant's confession might
have lH'en involuntanc and over objection of counsel,
rnlPd that the question was solely for the jury. The Court
tl1en·h~· refusC'd to have a fnll hearing on the question
of tlw volnntariness of the confession and refused to rule
wlwtlH·r thP confession in no circumstance could be deemrd voluntary. The unconstitutional New York procedure
would at l0m:t hav<' r0cp1ired that much. It is, therefore,
~uhmittPd that this procednre denied the appellant Dne
T'1·n( ('ss of ht\\· as gnarant<'<'d h~· the 14th Amendment
id" tit<> FnitPd Rtatc•s Constitution nndPr Jackson 1;.
0

/)1·11111!.
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It is fnrtlwr argnPd that by the trial court's ruling,
the appellant was denied procedural Due Process under
the laws of thP State of Utah.
The court long ago set forth the procedure to be
followed by the lesser court of this state in determining
the volnntarinPss of an admission or confession of a
criminal defendant before submitting the same to a jmy.
In State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P. 2d 178 (1943),
the court, following what is known as tlw "'Vigrnort''"
or "Orthodox" rule, held that the trial judge is to hear
all the evidence and then rule on the same for tlw pnrpose of admissibility of the confesRion. If further held
that the jury iR only to consider voluntariness as it affects, wPight or credibility of the confession. This conrt
has cited tlw ml<> with approval in StatP i:. Mares, 113
Ptah 225, 192 P. 2d 8(i1 (1948); State L Braascl1, m
Ptah 450, 229 P. 2d 289 (1951) and Stafp r. Ashdou•11. 5
T~.

2cl :l9, 29G P. 2d 12G (19!1G).

Tt is pat<'ntl~- c•vident from tlw record that th<' trial
<'ourt did not follo\\· the ahov<' procedure. Rather, hy
failing to rnlP on the volnntarin<•ss of tlw confession and
snhmitting the same to the jury, the trial court violated
the ,,·ell <>stahlis}1Pcl Ptah procPdurP. This patPnt violation r],•:nl~- n·<111i r<·s t11is conrt to n•\«•rs<> tliP C'Onvirtion
!ll' rl:1· ap]'< ll:ud.
: Sre :1 Wigrnoi·r, E\·idenc<' ~8Gl. (:1rd ed. 1940).
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CONCLUSION
'l'he record clearly indicated that the appellant's confession was erroneously allowed to be heard by the jury
before ruling on the voluntariness of the same. This action was contrary to that required to justify due process
of law under the 14th Amendment of the United States
Constitution and the recognized Utah Procedure. This
error clearly requires this court to reverse the action of
the court below and grant the appellant the relief sought
on appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID M. BOWN
231 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
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